Introduction
While one finds extensive literature on the decline in unionisation and increase in employer opposition to unions in many developed countries, unionisation in the airline industry has remained generally robust (Johnson, 2001; Hirsh and Macpherson, 2000) . This has even been the case amongst many operators which pursue a low fares/low cost business strategy, for example, Easyjet in the U.K., Goodjet in Sweden, Virgin Blue in Australia and Southwest Airlines in the U.S. Ryanair, a multi-national company of Irish origin, which has spearheaded low cost air travel in Europe, provides a notable exception. It has persistently refused to recognise or deal with trade unions. Ryanair is now Europe's largest, and still growing, low cost airline. It is also a controversial company, due largely to its outspoken boss, Michael O'Leary, its various strategies to contain or cut costs and its hostile relationship with trade unions. This paper addresses the multiple strategies used by the competing parties (trade unions and Ryanair management) during their long-running and highly publicised confrontations.
We begin by examining labour relations in the airline industry, with particular emphasis on the emergence of low cost airlines. We then review some issues of context, notably the legal framework relating to trade union recognition in Ireland, and provide a brief description of the unions that sought to organise in Ryanair. The remainder of the paper analyses disputes between Ryanair and trade unions in Ireland with some discussion of union activities in other European countries. Data for the analysis are derived from documentary sources such as the Irish Labour Court, High
Court and Supreme Court, as well as from interviews with officials from the Irish Airline Pilots Association (IALPA) and the umbrella body for trade unions, the Irish
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU). We requested interviews with management
representatives in Ryanair but were unsuccessful in this regard.
Labour Relations in the Airline Industry
The last three decades have seen significant changes in the airline industry.
Liberalization of air travel had resulted in a move away from the State-owned model of air travel to the emergence of low cost carriers such as Ryanair. The State-owned model was associated with a monopoly position and, because of the absence of competitive pressures, employees generally enjoyed job security, attractive pay and conditions and extensive collective bargaining (Blyton et al, 2001) . In contrast, the business model of low cost airlines, based on a cost leadership strategy, has been associated with comparatively poorer terms and conditions of employment (cf. Binggeli and Pompeo, 2002; Campbell and Kinglsey-Jones, 2002; Doganis, 2001; International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), 2002; Lawton, 2003; Strategic Direction, 2006) . Other changes in the airline industry, including privatisation, globalization, economic downturns, rising fuel prices and international terrorism have placed intense pressure on airlines to reduce operating costs. Since labour represent a significant proportion of such costs, employees and their unions have felt the brunt of cost cutting strategies. These have included greater work intensification, less job security, fewer breaks, lower earnings, pay freezes, introduction of two-tier pay systems and increased atypical employment contracts (cf. Blyton et al, 2001; Boyd, 2001; Broughton, 2005) . These strategies have been introduced despite relatively strong unionisation particularly when compared to other service industries such as hotels, restaurants and cleaning. Unionisation is estimated at 40 percent of overall air transport employees and over 60 percent of non-managerial employees of major airlines (Johnson, 2001; Hirsh and Macpherson, 2000) . Even 70 percent of low cost carriers recognise trade unions (ITF, 2002) . Boyd (2001:442) argues that "moves by major European airlines to sub-contract work to lower paid, less well trained staff appear to run contrary to virtuous 'mission' statements, and could be interpreted as a clear signal that, in reality, cost takes precedence over quality". Worryingly for trade unions, these cost containment strategies are increasingly being introduced unilaterally, with management bypassing established channels of consultation (Blyton et al, 2001 ). The problems facing airline employees are likely to be exacerbated where they do not have any union voice, and particularly where the airline adopts a union suppression strategy, such as in Ryanair.
Contemporary and Legal Context to Union Recognition Disputes in Ireland
Before addressing union recognition and avoidance in Ryanair, it is necessary to provide some background on the Irish context. Union density in Ireland reached its peak (62 per cent) in 1980 but has been in decline ever since (Gunnigle et al., 2002) .
In 2004, union density was 35 per cent, representing a fall of over 27 percentage points since 1980 (CSO, 2005) . While numerous factors have contributed to this decline, of particular pertinence to our analysis is the hardening of employer opposition to conceding union recognition. While initially most evident among American multinationals from the early 1980s, employer opposition has since become more diffuse:
"While the early non-union firms were predominantly US-owned and located primarily among 'high-tech' firms, more recent evidence from the early 1990s points to a broader diffusion of union avoidance to embrace both Irish and other foreign-owned firms, and a broader range of industrial sectors". (Gunnigle et al, 2006: 282) Research has identified a range of management strategies used to avoid and suppress trade unions. These include victimising and dismissing union activists, threatening to relocate or close the company, distributing anti-union literature, holding captive meetings, ignoring union grievances, creating non-union consultative structures, refusing union access to the workplace and employing consultants and lawyers in avoiding unions (D'Art and Turner, 2005; Dolan, 2006; Waldron, 2004) . Of course, such tactics are not exclusive to Ireland and have been identified as part of union avoidance strategies elsewhere. A number of these tactics will be examined later in regard to Ryanair's union avoidance strategy.
It is all the more significant that the fall in union density and hardening of employer opposition to union recognition has occurred during a prolonged period of so-called 'social partnership'. Since 1987, a series of centrally negotiated accords has been agreed between the 'social partners' (principally government, employers and trade unions, but also involving groups representing farming and community/voluntary interests). These agreements deal not only with pay, but also with a range of economic and social policy issues such as taxation, healthcare, welfare and employment.
Clearly, trade union involvement in the negotiation and implementation of such agreements has afforded organised labour considerable influence over economic and social policy. However, union involvement in the agreements has done little to stem the decline in union density or the growth of union avoidance at enterprise level: "While national social partnership agreements have provided unions with 'a place in the sun' and enhanced their influence over government macroeconomic strategy and social policy decision-making, the decline in union density continues, particularly in the private sector, as unions confront significant obstacles to organization in new, expanding sectors of the economy" (Geary, 2006: 5) .
A more specific and defining characteristic of the Irish context is the absence of laws regulating trade union recognition and a lack of involvement by the civil courts (High Court and Supreme Court) in resolving union recognition disputes. This is because the conventional Irish approach of dealing with the union-employer relationship was based on 'voluntarism', meaning minimum intervention by the law or third parties (including the State). Thus, recognition disputes were traditionally resolved through a trial of strength such as strikes, or by referral to the Labour Court; not a court but a State body composed of employer and worker representatives which resolves labour disputes, usually through non-binding recommendations (cf. Gunnigle et al., 2002) .
However, recent years have seen a shift away from voluntarism due in part to trade union unrest over the growing incidence of union avoidance and declining union density.
Faced with mounting difficulties in securing union recognition, the labour movement This legislation appears confusing in its objectives and role because disputes can only be referred under it where the employer does not engage in collective bargaining yet the law does not provide for statutory union recognition as an outcome. Unsurprisingly, the law has been criticised for not providing an effective mechanism for securing union recognition (cf. D' Art and Turner, 2003) . The only issues that the legislation does address are terms and conditions of employment, dispute resolution and disciplinary procedures. Critically, the legislation gives the Labour Court the power to issue binding decisions on these issues so, for example, it could set the pay and conditions of employees in a dispute. It is this aspect of the law that indicates a move away from voluntarism and which has been labelled by employers, including Ryanair, as a 'back door' route to union recognition. Airways "expensive b******" and travel agents as "f******" who should be "taken out and shot" (Clark, 2005) . Such is the dominance of Michael O'Leary within
Ryanair plc.

Ryanair is an
Ryanair that in interviews with trade union officials for this paper, they often referred to 'he' instead of 'Ryanair' or 'the company'.
Trade Unions with Membership in Ryanair
In Ireland, two trade unions have been at the centre of confrontations with Ryanair. Barrett (2004: 93) argues, "…the most significant contribution to the Ryanair low cost base comes from its labour productivity". Lower labour costs and significant labour productivity from the 3,700 staff have been achieved in a number of ways. First, Ryanair has a high passenger to staff member ratio (Table 1) . Second, it contracts out services to specialist operators, such as catering and aircraft maintenance. Third, productivity is increased through staff multi-tasking, for example, cabin crew 'tidy up' between flights (Kangis and O'Reilly, 2003) . Fourth, part of the pay of flying crew is performance related, for example, cabin crew receive commission for selling duty free goods during flights (Kangis and O'Reilly, 2003) . Fifth, Ryanair's cost cutting extends to crew paying for their own training, uniforms and meals and head office staff supplying their own pens and not charging their mobile phones at work (Clark, 2005) . Lastly, Ryanair staff own 130 million shares in the company, providing an incentive for greater labour productivity. The IALPA is critical of the practice of cabin crew paying for their training, not only in principle, but also because it has significant implications for cabin crew employed from Central and Eastern European countries. The union argues that such staff would have to take loans of approximately €3,000-€5,000 (approx. $4,000-$6,680) to pay for the training, thereby becoming a form of "indentured labour" that "could not afford to walk out after a week because they have a loan" (Interview, IALPA Union Official).
Labour Practices in Ryanair
Once their training period is finished, the union claims that they are often not directly 
Ryanair Avoidance and Suppression of Trade Unions
Crushing SIPTU Ryanair's first major battle with a trade union in Ireland began in 1997 when SIPTU requested improved pay and conditions and union recognition on behalf of 39 groundhandling agents in its membership in Dublin Airport. Ryanair refused SIPTU's demands. As the dispute continued into 1998, a series of work stoppages and demonstrations were undertaken by SIPTU. Ryanair cancelled airside security clearances of the ground-handling agents after it claimed the workers had intimidated staff and passengers. As the dispute progressed, the Taoiseach (Prime Minister),
Bertie Ahern, encouraged Ryanair to recognise the union. He said that while he respected the decisions of some global firms to offer "…first-class conditions to operate alternatives acceptable to their workforces, other things being equal, it is preferable that larger companies can accommodate the presence of trade unions" (Sheehan, 1998b) .
SIPTU continued to engage in industrial action leading to the closure of Dublin airport on 7 March. The next day, an enquiry team established by the Government formulated proposals to reopen the airport, which SIPTU and Ryanair accepted.
Subsequently, this team produced a report on the dispute. At the request of Ryanair management, the team met with 16 groups of their employees and found that the majority had a negative attitude towards trade union organisation and some disputed the right of a minority to join a union. They believed that unionisation would decrease flexibility and would be unlikely to result in significant enhancement of pay and benefits (Flynn and McAuley, 1998) . It is noteworthy that the meetings were held at the request of Ryanair, though the report did not explicitly state how the employees were selected. In addition, the airline's legal advisor and/or head of personnel attended almost all the meetings.
The enquiry team commissioned a comparison of pay across a number of airlines and disagreed with Ryanair claims that their ground-handling agents earned more money, had more time off and had better benefits than their counterparts in other airlines.
Their report encouraged the company to allow union representation for workers in grievance and disciplinary situations. SIPTU alleged that three probationary There were two important consequences of the strike. The first was that Ryanair did not concede to any of SIPTU's demands and continued to remain non-union. The second is that it appears that SIPTU's inability to 'break' Ryanair sent out a strong message to other unions that the strike, as the traditional union weapon, was not effective against the company. During the strike, Sheehan (1998a) questioned the wisdom of the union taking on Ryanair:
"…given the high stakes involved, at a national level, it is at least arguable that the union picked the wrong company to do battle with. Ryanair's track record on the issue of union recognition has been well documented….".
Sheehan's scepticism now seems well placed. Since the strike, there has been no industrial action taken against Ryanair and SIPTU has played a less public and vocal role in representing employees. Union sources estimate that SIPTU's membership within Ryanair is less than 100. Since the strike, the pilots union IALPA has taken the lead in organised labour's confrontations.
Ryanair and its Pilots: the Re-training Dispute
Since 2004 
Ryanair and its Pilots: The REPA Dispute
In addition to using industrial relations legislation and the civil courts, the pilots union has been involved in a more innovative method of challenging Ryanair, through the creation of the Ryanair European Pilots Association (REPA unions. In fact, the High Court turned the bullying allegation on Ryanair, when it described the conditions attached to the re-training of pilots as "most onerous"
conditions, which "bore all the hallmarks of oppression" (The Irish Times, 2006).
Ryanair and its Pilots: Pay Rises for Non-Union Staff
In 2005, Ryanair announced a 3 percent pay rise but only to employees who did not negotiate through unions. European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF) official, Erika Young, said that the selective increase "…borders almost on blackmail. Inferring that affiliation to a trade union is detrimental to the company's profits is extremely misleading, given the success of other unionised low-fares and network carriers" (AFX News,
2005).
Ryanair personnel director, Eddie Wilson, said the increase applied to all staff that participated in the 'direct negotiations' with the company and, as only Dublin-based pilots did not do so, they were left out. He argued that the pay increase "reinforces the strength of Ryanair's model whereby people negotiate directly with the company and as a result enjoy better pay and conditions than our low-pay unionised competitors" (AFX News, 2005). (Harper, 2003) . While none of these objectives were attained, the Belgian court concluded that Belgian labour law should take precedence because that was the country in which the former Ryanair employees habitually worked. Broughton (2005: 20) argued that the decision was significant as it was "the first instance of the place of employment being used as the principal criterion for determining which law is applicable to an airline's workers". Ryanair's policy of vehement opposition to trade unions derives in large measure from its business model which seeks to establish competitive advantage via extreme cost cutting measures, going further than other low cost airlines. The company has stated its belief that there is a link between union avoidance and maintaining low costs and flexibility:
Ryanair and Trade Unions in Europe
"If [Ryanair] were forced to recognise SIPTU by a minority of its employees, it will be forced out of business by an increasing number of competitors. The scope for growth in employment will be diminished and jobs will be lost as the unions seek to replicate the inefficient work practices and attitudes which prevail at Dublin Airport, within Ryanair" (Quoted in Flynn and McAuley, 1998: 31) .
Thus, we can identify Ryanair's strategy of aligning its low cost business model with its industrial relations strategy. The link between companies' business models and industrial relations strategies is hardly new but considerable attention has been paid to such links in so-called 'high road' employments, particularly multinational companies with sophisticated human resources policies. Ryanair, in contrast, is an example of a 'low road' employment where its business model directly influences its industrial relations approach to the detriment of employees. The company's commercial success is likely to make it a role model for other low cost airlines, who may also replicate Ryanair's industrial relations practices.
In addition to chasing the bottom line, we feel that Ryanair's anti-union stance is heavily influenced by Michael O'Leary. His views on unions reflect his free market ideology, which according to IALPA and ICTU, is also extremely dominant in the thinking of company management. ICTU were of the view that Ryanair's behaviour "is from another age … and it seems largely to be driven by O'Leary himself. It's very much his view of the world" (Interview, ICTU Union Official). Ryanair's adoption of extreme cost leadership allied to the fact that its chief executive has embraced a high profile renders it a particular variant of low cost provision in the airline sector and one that at least some other low cost carriers are likely to embrace.
Nor is its influence likely to stop there. A number of older, highly unionised airlines have recently embraced aspects of the low-cost business model (e.g. reduced staffing, lower pay and benefits) in the face deregulation and more intense competition (cf.
Strategic Direction, 2006; Harvey and Turnbull, 2002) . By following Ryanair, other airlines have legitimised Ryanair's business model and, concomitantly, its non-union status.
Ryanair's non-union status and the labour practices it employs exist despite extensive employment legislation and Ireland's well-documented national social partnership system. However, this is not necessarily surprising. While social partnership is extensive at the national level between the Government, trade unions and employer organisations, a myriad of employer approaches to trade unions exist at enterprise level. Indeed, Government objectives that national level partnership would be mirrored by enterprise level partnership have not transpired. There is no mechanism within the social partnership system to force or persuade employers to facilitate trade unions. To do so would be difficult given continuing trade union decline in the private sector and a fear amongst policy makers and the social partners that forcing employers to pursue a pro-union stance would be detrimental to Ireland's business environment. While ICTU contends that Ryanair's behaviour is from 'another age', it cannot simply be considered a 'rogue' employer in terms of union avoidance. Indeed, union avoidance is now commonplace among many large private sector employers.
What differentiates Ryanair from many other non-union companies is that union avoidance represents a critical factor in its business model and it commits a high level of resources to union avoidance. This is most clearly manifested in the lengths the company has gone to challenge the legitimacy of the State dispute resolution machinery. Ryanair's recent victory in the Supreme Court has already paved the way for other non-union companies to challenge previous Labour Court decisions under the Industrial Relations Acts 2001 (cf. Higgins, 2007 . The company is also distinguished by the fact that it has been strongly pursued by a trade union, while other non-union companies do not get the same union attention, primarily because trade unions find it difficult to get their foot in the door and some non-union companies, typically multi-nationals, have a reputation of providing attractive pay and conditions (cf. Gunnigle et al, 2002) .
It is clear that IALPA has pursued a different strategy to SIPTU. While SIPTU used the traditional union weapon of the strike, IALPA has so far refrained from using industrial action and has instead used industrial relations legislation as well as the civil courts. The difference in strategies can be attributed to a number of reasons.
First, industrial action was an unsuccessful strategy for SIPTU. Second, the current size and geographical spread of the airline dilutes the possible effects of industrial action in one country. IALPA officials regard the 1998 strike as a missed opportunity because Ryanair was still small and most of its business was located in Ireland. They believe that to inflict comparable damage on the company today would be a much more difficult task since Ryanair is bigger, stronger and its operations "…calculated that its worth spending the money on the legal system as opposed to having to not surrender but having to accept that they have responsibility to deal collectively with the pilots union at this point. That's a concern for us, that they would be able to string out the process or have the potential to string out the process to the point where people become frustrated and decide its not worth it anymore". (Interview, ICTU Union Official)
Similarly, IALPA believe that Ryanair's court cases are "all means of keeping us busy, the danger of serious legal costs and the pressurizing of individuals" (Interview, IALPA Union Official). Blyton et al (2001: 459) note that civil aviation unions still have considerable power resources. IALPA though, with a large proportion of pilots in its membership and seemingly significant resources given the number of court actions it has taken against Ryanair, are not satisfied that the needs of their members have been adequately addressed.
As for the medium term future of relations between Ryanair and IALPA, it is likely that the courts and dispute resolution institutions will remain the primary battleground. In interviews, union officials were hopeful that another victory against The growth in neo-liberalism internationally has allowed companies like Ryanair to push its business strategy to the detriment of trade unions, as evidenced by Ryanair's takeover of Buzz airline in the U.K. and its subsequent refusal to acknowledge the established trade unions in Buzz. There is growing literature on the extent to which European business systems have accommodated MNCs. Clark et al (2005: 514) argue that industrial democracy and the enforcement of employment rights involves cost to the EU consumer and that "we all like the idea of workers in the EU being well treated … but like the idea of paying for it less so". Such realities have filtered through to the national business systems, which Clark et al. (2005) suggest are leaning towards economic efficiency rather than industrial democracy. In the Irish context, it has been argued that Ireland has effectively restructured some its business system to accommodate the industrial relations approaches of MNCs, particularly their desire to avoid trade unions (Gunnigle et al., 2006) .
Conclusion
We have seen that a number of factors have contributed to the adoption of Ryanair's union suppression strategy, particularly the free market ideology of its CEO and the alignment of its business model and human resources strategy. In addition, we have noted that Ireland's national social partnership model has not inhibited, or attempted to inhibit, the development of Ryanair's staunch anti-union stance. It is clear that Ryanair's union suppression strategy has been successful. While union officials interviewed argued that the ground handling agent dispute had little impact on SIPTU's recognition attempts, SIPTU has not pursued recognition in the interim.
Whether or not the union considers Ryanair a 'lost cause', SIPTU appears to have diverted its attention away from Ryanair. Thus, the only union that appears determined to confront Ryanair is IALPA. It should also be borne in mind that IALPA represents a minority of high-skilled employees (pilots) who are not as easy to replace as other airline workers. Since SIPTU's withdrawal, the vast majority of Ryanair's lower skilled and lower paid workers are largely are at the mercy of unilateral decision-making, which remains, for the most part, unchallenged. issue. You could tell just by body language, the way they gave evidence in court that this was a religion" (Interview, IALPA Union Official).
However, as any new chief executive would be answerable to shareholders, attempts to create consistency or change labour practices may be restricted by the need to maintain the currently high profit levels, which O'Leary has delivered. Michael O'Leary's approach to business in general is aptly summed up in the following anecdote. The story goes that Michael O'Leary was once asked by a union official about 'why he was such a bollix?', to which he replied 'its nothing personal, its just bums on seats'.
